No doubt, the presence everywhere of devastating and heart-breaking evil in a world created by a perfectly good God presents, from a human perspective, the deepest of all problems. How can — and why would — an all-good God permit, or even ordain, so much material, moral, relational, and spiritual evil? The biblical writers do not avoid this question; they voice it repeatedly with searing honesty amid their own suffering. ‘Why do the wicked live, reach old age, and grow mighty in power?’ (Job 21:7). Even Christ himself cried out in anguish from the cross, ‘My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?’ (Matt 27:46; echoing the words of King David in Psalm 22).
Christian thinkers such as Augustine of North Africa have sought to understand this problem within the larger framework of God’s goodness. Augustine’s quick answer is this: ‘For God judged it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit any evil to exist.’1Augustine, Enchiridion, 3.9-11, 8.27; Outler ed., 342, 355, slightly amended, italics supplied. A useful discussion of providence and evil including its personal dimensions is Paul Helm, The Providence of God (IVP, 1993), 193-217. ‘For it would not be done without his allowing it — and surely his permission is not unwilling but willing — nor would he who is good allow the evil to be done, unless in his omnipotence he could bring good even out of evil.’2Augustine, Enchiridion, 26.100; Outler ed., 399. More fully, Augustine says:
‘[T]he Christian believes that nothing exists save God himself and what comes from him … By this Trinity, supremely and equally and unchangeably good, were all things created. But they were not created supremely, equally, nor unchangeably good. Still, each single created thing is good, and taken as a whole they are very good … In this universe, even what is called evil, when it is rightly ordered and kept in its place, commends the good more eminently … For the Omnipotent God … would not allow any evil in his works, unless in his omnipotence and goodness, as the Supreme Good, he is able to bring forth good out of evil. What, after all, is anything we call evil except the privation of good? … For God judged it better to bring good out of evil than not to permit any evil to exist.’3Augustine, Enchiridion, 3.9-11, 8.27; Outler ed., 342, 355, slightly amended, italics supplied. The Leiden Synopsis (Disputation 11.20-25; 108) echoes Augustine’s reflections on the matter: ‘permission for all sins belongs to God’s providence. For although sins are evil, and accordingly cannot be provided by God, nevertheless the permission of them is good. So then, God both wills and directly decrees the permission, and ordains it for some good purpose that is greater than that of which the absence is the evil that is permitted. For since God is good to the highest degree, he would in no way permit there to be anything evil in his workings, unless he were so almighty that even concerning evil he would still do good.’
Yet the very nature of evil places severe limits on our ability to understand it. Why? Because evil is not a thing in its own right, but the corruption and perversion of good — the contradiction of God himself, who is the source of all that is good. For this reason, as we grapple with this profound and persistent question, it is essential to return to the framework Scripture provides.4Extracted in slightly adjusted form from Benjamin Dean, Great Truths — Sin and Death: 2.1 The Origin of Sin, available at https://www.greattruthsglobal.org/sin-and-death/.
Sin and Evil Are Not From God But Are Within God’s Allowance
Where sin originally came from, and how and why it came forth, are mysteries to which the Bible provides no complete explanation. Evil could not have come from a perfectly good God. But by creating a world into which evil could emerge and did indeed enter, God created the possibility of sin. Being all-knowing, it came as no surprise to him. Sin was contained within his decree. He deliberately decided to allow it. ‘All “permission” is an act of God’s will; he willed to permit it.’5Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics. Abridged, 348. Clearly, its emergence was within his counsel.6Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics. Abridged, 340. But the Creator’s intention in permitting evil, and at some level or in some way willing evil, is a good intention. We say ‘good,’ because God is himself nothing but Good, the source of all goodness and being and meaning. Sin and evil is a rebellious flight away from God, and thus from all goodness and meaning, that is, into darkness and therefore into ultimate unintelligibility. Because it is in flight away from God, sin and evil is irrational. Therefore, we cannot hope to have any final, clear, rational knowledge of sin and evil in the way we can for faith in God, for righteousness and love. Indeed, Paul cautions us: ‘be wise as to what is good and innocent as to what is evil’ (Rom 16:19). We can only seek to view the possibility and existence of sin in the light of the goodness of God — but with caution, for in the end, sin and evil are incomprehensible.7Thanks to Robert Doyle for commenting here.
Sin and Evil Had No Place in the Original Creation
Creation and fall, then, are completely different to one another. Sin cannot be attributed to the nature of creation. Nor can sin be blamed upon God. Out of absolutely nothing, God created a ‘very good’ world (Gen 1:31). Sin had no part in the original nature of created things. ‘God made man upright’ (Eccl 7:29). God’s human creatures came into existence in a state of innocence, situated in an entirely excellent environment. ‘The evil can therefore only come after the good, can only exist through and on the good, and can really consist of nothing but the corruption of the good.’8Herman Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, trans. Henry Zylstra (Eerdmans, 1956), 229. Sin is parasitic. ‘The good is necessary even for evil to exist.’9Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics. Abridged, 340. Sin is therefore clearly not a condition of created nature but the desecration of it. ‘To the extent that it clearly falls within God’s purpose and will, we could say that up to a point and in some sense it had to be there. But then certainly it always had to be there as something that ought not to be there and has no right to exist.’10Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics. Abridged, 352. Refer here to John Calvin’s scattered discussion of God’s secret and incomprehensible will, e.g., Institutes, 1.17.2 (212-13 note 4); 1.18.1-4 (228-237); 3.20.43 (906); 3.24.17 (985-87); all page numbers are from Battles’ translation. See Paul Helm’s various discussions of this, e.g., in Calvin: A Guide for the Perplexed (T&T Clark, 2008), 89-92; idem, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford University Press, 2004), 106, 301, 312-13.
—
- 1Augustine, Enchiridion, 3.9-11, 8.27; Outler ed., 342, 355, slightly amended, italics supplied. A useful discussion of providence and evil including its personal dimensions is Paul Helm, The Providence of God (IVP, 1993), 193-217.
- 2Augustine, Enchiridion, 26.100; Outler ed., 399.
- 3Augustine, Enchiridion, 3.9-11, 8.27; Outler ed., 342, 355, slightly amended, italics supplied. The Leiden Synopsis (Disputation 11.20-25; 108) echoes Augustine’s reflections on the matter: ‘permission for all sins belongs to God’s providence. For although sins are evil, and accordingly cannot be provided by God, nevertheless the permission of them is good. So then, God both wills and directly decrees the permission, and ordains it for some good purpose that is greater than that of which the absence is the evil that is permitted. For since God is good to the highest degree, he would in no way permit there to be anything evil in his workings, unless he were so almighty that even concerning evil he would still do good.’
- 4Extracted in slightly adjusted form from Benjamin Dean, Great Truths — Sin and Death: 2.1 The Origin of Sin, available at https://www.greattruthsglobal.org/sin-and-death/.
- 5Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics. Abridged, 348.
- 6Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics. Abridged, 340.
- 7Thanks to Robert Doyle for commenting here.
- 8Herman Bavinck, Our Reasonable Faith, trans. Henry Zylstra (Eerdmans, 1956), 229.
- 9Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics. Abridged, 340.
- 10Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics. Abridged, 352. Refer here to John Calvin’s scattered discussion of God’s secret and incomprehensible will, e.g., Institutes, 1.17.2 (212-13 note 4); 1.18.1-4 (228-237); 3.20.43 (906); 3.24.17 (985-87); all page numbers are from Battles’ translation. See Paul Helm’s various discussions of this, e.g., in Calvin: A Guide for the Perplexed (T&T Clark, 2008), 89-92; idem, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford University Press, 2004), 106, 301, 312-13.